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Voluntary Disclosures by Activist Shareholders
Abstract
Using hand-collected data, we find that activist shareholders often publicly disclose
open letters that demand various changes in corporate operating decisions at their
target firms. These letters are associated with significant stock price movements, de-
creased bid-ask spreads, and key activism outcomes such as directorship wins, corporate
strategy shifts, and proxy advisor recommendations. Managers commonly respond to
activists’ open letters with their own voluntary disclosures. We conclude that activists
use voluntary disclosure to mitigate investor information asymmetry and that man-
agers’ voluntary disclosures can be induced by activists.
1 Introduction
Verrecchia (1983) predicts that managers’ voluntary disclosures are typically induced
by compensation contracts based on outcomes such as stock price. Empirical research has
therefore linked voluntary disclosure actions to managerial stock compensation (e.g., Nagar
et al., 2003). However, Jung and Kwon (1988) predict that managers’ voluntary disclosures
can also be induced by the informative disclosures of third parties. We therefore empirically
assess corporate governance theories that model activist shareholders as investors who may
publicly disclose information about their agenda in order to mitigate information asymmetry
among investors (e.g., Cohn and Rajan, 2013; Harris and Raviv, 2010). Specifically, we
analyze investor response to activists’ open letters and how managers respond through their
own voluntary disclosure choices.1
Following Cohn and Rajan (2013), our main conjecture is that activists possess private
knowledge about their agenda at a target firm, and that this agenda is not common knowledge
among investors (including managers). For example, an activist may have an agenda to alter
a target’s future corporate operating decisions. Thus, activists may elect to publicly disclose
information about their agenda in order to gain the support of other investors. Consistent
with this idea, we observe that activists commonly publicly release open letters on how
operations can be improved at their targets, and these letters often seek support from other
shareholders for this agenda (see Section 2 and Appendix 1 for examples).
At the same time, Khorana et al. (2017) observe that not all activists make public disclo-
sures. To help explain this result, we conceptually expand the basic cost-benefit framework
from classical disclosure theory to an activist’s disclosure choice (e.g., Verrecchia, 1983). Dis-
closure costs for activists may include a decrease in their relative information advantage and
their uncertainty about how the market will react to their disclosures. Disclosure benefits
may include its facilitating of activists’ persuasion and coordination efforts among investors.
1Relatedly, Beyer et al. (2010, p. 297) and Verrecchia (2001) suggest extending the management disclosure
literature to the disclosures of other parties.
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In addition, Healy and Palepu (2001, Section 2.1) emphasize that voluntary disclosure
serves primarily a signaling role in the financial markets. We therefore posit two main
reasons that activists’ open letters may be informative to investors. First, open letters may
provide new information about the activist’s existing plan and the probability of its success.
Second, open letters may signal to investors that there is a fundamental change in the activist
campaign. More importantly, activists’ reputation and credibility, as well as the extent to
which they reveal new information in their disclosures, will likely further impact whether
their disclosures ultimately have meaningful economic consequences such as stock price and
bid-ask spread effects.2 We therefore start our analysis by hand collecting a large sample of
activists’ open letters from 2012 to 2014 and using several market measures to assess their
information content.3
We use both unsigned and signed market-adjusted returns measured over varying intervals
around the release date of the open letter. We use unsigned returns because we have no ex
ante expectation about whether an activist’s open letter will be associated with positive
or negative returns; we only have reason to believe it may change investors’ beliefs about
a target. For example, activists may believe their agendas are value increasing when other
investors do not. In addition, if activists release private signals in their open letters, we would
also expect these letters to impact adverse selection in trade. We therefore complement
returns with DTAQ bid-ask spreads.
We first find significant unsigned returns of 4.0 percent for the [−1,+1 day] interval, where
day 0 is the release date of the activist open letter. As we widen the return interval in both
directions, the magnitude of the effect increases and remains significant, which suggests that
these returns are not sentiment driven. We then assess signed returns and find significant
2An alternative hypothesis is that activists lack credibility in the market, and their disclosures will not be
systematically informative (e.g., Stocken, 2000). Section 2 elaborates further on these theoretical arguments.
3We take this approach because we are not aware of a large data set that contains the release dates of
activists’ open letters. For example, SharkRepellent does not include this information. We discuss our data
and use of SharkRepellent in more detail in Section 3. Note that our sample includes many well-known
activists, including Elliott Management, Icahn Enterprises, Starboard Value, and Third Point Capital; and
many well-known target firms, including Allergan, Apple, Darden, and Yahoo.
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returns of +2.4 percent for the [−1,+1 day] interval; this effect also strengthens as we widen
the return interval.4 Moreover, both unsigned and signed returns increase more for activists
who have a stronger reputation in the market, as proxied for by AUM. We also find that
both unsigned and signed returns are significantly different from zero when we set the return
window to day 0 alone. This analysis and those that follow control for a variety of firm-level
and activist-level attributes. We also take steps to ensure that all of our findings are not
confounded by other information events such as corporate disclosures, analyst forecasts, the
initial announcement of the activist campaign, and 13D filings.
We next build on the prior result by testing whether activists’ open letters are associated
with investor information asymmetry, as proxied for by DTAQ percent bid-ask spreads.
To the extent that activists’ open letters reveal to other investors new information about
a target’s value, we would expect these letters to impact information asymmetry among
investors. In theory, the direction of this result depends on whether open letters decrease an
activist’s relative information advantage or prompt other investors to collect more private
information about a target (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Kim and Verrecchia, 1994).
We find that for the [−1,+1 day] interval around the open letter release date, mean
percent bid-ask spreads decrease by about 1.7 percentage points relative to a control period.
We also find similar results for [−5,+5 days] and for day 0 alone.5 Taken together, our
returns and spread findings suggest that activists’ open letters are informative to investors
and decrease investor information asymmetry.
We next link activists’ open letters to key outcomes of their campaigns. Although this
analysis extends beyond the scope of the theoretical prediction that activists may make
informative disclosures, it speaks to the important question of what benefits accrue to ac-
4We find similar results for raw firm returns and for a variety of other return benchmarks. By comparison,
prior studies find that the initial announcement of activist campaigns from 2012 to 2014 is associated with
a +6.23 percent CAR, and that “bad news” and “good news” management earnings forecasts are associated
with −9.96 percent CARs and +1.93 percent CARs, respectively (Hutton et al., 2003; Khorana et al.,
2017, Figure 2). Thus, our magnitudes appear to be reasonable. We show further in Section 4.2 that our
magnitudes relate well to those in the activism literature.
5In Section 3, we take several steps to ensure that we are capturing the information asymmetry component
of spreads and not the order processing component.
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tivists for releasing open letters. In a matched-sample analysis of activism campaigns with
and without open letters, we find that activism campaigns with open letters are associated
with an increased likelihood that activists win a proxy contest, attain a directorship, achieve
governance or strategic demands arising from their campaigns, receive a favorable recommen-
dation from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) or Glass Lewis, and successfully elicit
a special shareholder meeting. These findings are consistent with the idea that by reducing
investor information asymmetry, activists’ open letters facilitate change at their targets.6
In our final analysis, we assess managers’ response to activists’ open letters. To the extent
that activists’ open letters cast managers or their firms in an unfavorable light, managers
may respond in an attempt to ameliorate these effects. Indeed, Section 2 provides one
example of eBay’s direct response to an activist’s open letter. However, managers may not
systematically respond to activists’ open letters if they do not believe these disclosures are
credible, among other reasons.
As we discuss further in Section 2, the channels through which managers often respond to
activists may include 8-K press releases and voluntary amendments to proxy materials (i.e.,
SEC form DEFA14A). Accordingly, we test and find that managers’ 8-K filings increase
significantly after the release date of activists’ open letters, relative to a control period.
We also test and find that DEFA14A filings increase significantly after the release date of
activists’ open letters, relative to a control period.7 To account for potential calendar-time
patterns in 8-K and DEFA14A filings, we employ a variety of control periods and find similar
results throughout. Overall, these findings suggest that managers’ voluntary disclosures can
be induced by activists, perhaps as managers attempt to shape the public narrative about
6Since we cannot isolate a strong instrument for open letters, we can only analyze the circumstances in
which it is optimal for activists to release open letters. An alternative hypothesis is that activists release
open letters to manipulate a target’s stock price or to achieve some other goal. Our evidence does not
support these hypotheses. Also, as Appendix 1 shows, open letters can make many demands; one letter in
our sample makes over 50. Our activism outcomes only summarily capture significant changes in a target.
See Section 3 for more detail on this feature of our analysis.
7Cooper et al. (2017) and Lerman and Livnat (2010) find that firms’ press releases are often filed in
8-Ks. We therefore design our 8-K measure to capture these voluntary disclosures. Note that we do not use
management forecasts because these may arise from corporate operating decisions unrelated to open letters.
This is not as much of a concern with 8-Ks and DEFA14As.
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their firm as it relates to activists’ letters.
To summarize, theory predicts that activists may use public disclosure to mitigate infor-
mation asymmetry among investors, and that managers may respond to these disclosures.
Consistent with this idea, we find that activists’ open letters are informative to investors,
as evidenced by significant stock price reactions and decreased bid-ask spreads around their
release dates. We also find that activists’ open letters are leading indicators of key activism
outcomes. Managers appear to respond to open letters with increased voluntary disclosure
of their own. These findings obtain across a variety of specifications and are validated by
several placebo tests and the use of control firms.
Our findings make several contributions to the literature. First, the seminal study by
Verrecchia (1983) predicts that managers’ voluntary disclosures are typically induced by
compensation contracts based on outcomes such as stock price. Empirical research has
therefore linked voluntary disclosure to managerial stock compensation (e.g., Nagar et al.,
2003). However, Jung and Kwon (1988, p. 147) predict that third-party disclosures can
also trigger managers’ reaction function. Consistent with this idea, our findings suggest that
some managers’ voluntary disclosure choices are driven by activists’ disclosures.
Second, our findings have corporate finance implications to the extent that activists’
open letters impact stock price, information asymmetry, and management disclosures, and
thus a firm’s cost of capital (e.g., Armstrong et al., 2011). Relatedly, we also complement
theoretical research that links the cost of capital to management disclosures. These studies
can be conceptually expanded to the disclosures made by any party, including shareholders
(e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991). Indeed, there have been calls for additional research
on the economic effects of disclosures made by third parties (e.g., Beyer et al., 2010, p. 297).
Third, our findings complement standard price-setting models that assume that investors
act on information solely by trading in company shares (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980).
We show that this is not the case for all investors: some investors elect to release some
of their information publicly. In this respect, we complement Ljungqvist and Qian (2016),
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who study 124 short-sales and find that short sellers facilitate downward price pressure by
releasing unfavorable reports about their shorted firms. We also extend Back et al. (2018)
and Edmans (2009) by showing that activists may be able to alter a target’s stock liquidity
by actions other than trading, such as public disclosure.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides institutional
background and motivates our hypotheses in light of prior literature. Section 3 describes our
data. Section 4 provides our empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Hypothesis Motiva-
tion
In 2017, activist funds managed over $120 billion in assets and attracted nearly a quarter
of all hedge fund flows (Khorana et al., 2017). The increasing presence of activists in the
financial markets has spawned a considerable number of studies on their activities (e.g., Brav
et al., 2015; Edmans and Holderness, 2017). In particular, recent theoretical studies model
how activists’ information dissemination activities may help to facilitate their campaigns
(e.g., Cohn and Rajan, 2013; Harris and Raviv, 2010). However, these theories remain
largely untested.
At the start of an activist’s campaign, other investors in the target are inherently unin-
formed about an activist’s agenda. This feature of activism drives the basic theoretical result
that activists possess private knowledge about a target that creates problematic information
asymmetry among investors. One key prediction from these models is that activists may
publicly disclose information about their agenda in order to decrease this information asym-
metry and avert the failure of their campaigns.8 We analyze this prediction in the setting of
activists’ open letters.
8This argument assumes that any free-rider concerns do not deter such activities (e.g., Admati et al.,
1994). Activists may also use private disclosure channels such as phone calls to specific investors. However,
we would not expect to find a large investor reaction to these activities.
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We include a brief excerpt from the 12-page, June 2, 2014, open letter released by Star-
board Value LP (the activist) and addressed to the CEO of the packaging company Mead-
Westvaco Corporation (the target):
The purpose of this letter is to outline our thoughts and perspectives on value
creation opportunities at the Company. We look forward to continuing our di-
alogue with the Company and will make ourselves available to discuss the con-
tents of this letter at your convenience.. . . We believe that the combined value
of MeadWestvaco’s assets far exceeds the Company’s current share price, and
this value is being obscured by MeadWestvaco’s excessive corporate overhead
and conglomerate structure. In order to unlock this value, we believe that man-
agement should take the appropriate actions, as outlined in more detail below,
to improve operating margins, explore a separation of the Company’s remaining
non-core assets, and improve capital allocation.. . . We believe that there is an op-
portunity to reduce corporate overhead by consolidating regional headquarters,
reducing duplicative administrative staff, and flattening the organization struc-
ture. Reducing the Company’s corporate overhead to be in line with peers would
result in $160 million of cost savings, significantly higher than the Company’s
target range of between $50 million and $62.5 million.. . . Based on our analysis,
we believe MeadWestvaco could expand its Food & Beverage segment margins to
be in line with Graphic Packaging’s Paperboard segment margins, which would
result in EBITDA of $612 million, or more, by 2015. This would imply that the
Food & Beverage business is worth over $4.6 billion, or $29 per share, assuming
an industry average 7.5x EV/EBITDA valuation multiple.
The above letter spans 5,299 words and provides suggestions on how to improve many
aspects of MeadWestvaco’s business.9 The [−1,+1 day] market-adjusted return for this
letter at MeadWestvaco is +7.4 percent, where day 0 is the letter’s release date.
The above is but one example of an activist’s open letter that appears to be informative
for investors (see Appendix 1 for additional examples). However, it is not ex ante obvious
that all open letters will be informative for investors. For example, some open letters may
not be as specific as Starboard’s letter about MeadWestvaco. Open letters may also be in-
consequential in markets where public information is already rich (e.g., Leuz and Verrecchia,
2000). Alternatively, some open letters may not be credible to other investors (e.g., Rogers
and Stocken, 2005; Stocken, 2000).
9For the full open letter, see https://goo.gl/D2VRAd.
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Using stock returns as our first proxy for the information content of open letters, these
considerations lead to our first hypothesis, stated in the null:
H1: Activists’ open letters are not associated with stock price reactions at a target around
their release.
To the extent activists’ open letters are informative to investors, they may not only
affect price, but also information asymmetry among investors. The theoretical basis for
this argument is that activists’ open letters may substitute for their private information
collection, thereby decreasing adverse selection and information asymmetry in the market
for firm shares—e.g., smaller bid-ask spreads (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Glosten
and Milgrom, 1985).
Conversely, some investors may respond to activists’ open letters by collecting more pri-
vate information, thereby increasing adverse selection and information asymmetry in trade—
e.g., larger bid-ask spreads (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). Yet another possibility is that
activists’ open letters could have no effect on information asymmetry. For example, if ac-
tivists’ open letters identically change every investor’s beliefs of the mean levels and priced
covariances of a target’s future payoffs, then prices could change without affecting informa-
tion asymmetry. These considerations lead to our second hypothesis, stated in the null:
H2: Activists’ open letters are not associated with a target’s bid-ask spread.
H1 and H2 assess whether activists use open letters to inform other investors. To the
extent these letters prove persuasive, we would also expect them to correspond to activism
outcomes. For example, managers may face information asymmetries with activists that
open letters partly mitigate. Managers may also be more likely to accommodate activists’
demands if they believe other investors are convinced by activists’ open letters.
By contrast, open letters notwithstanding, activists may still fail to enact change at their
targets due to their low minority ownership, if other investors disagree with their agendas,
or for other reasons. Activists may also not follow through on the commitments made in
their open letters, or they may use open letters to manipulate the stock price at a target or
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to achieve some other goal. In these cases, we would expect no relation between open letters
and activism outcomes. We would also expect this outcome if activists achieve the same
level of persuasion by using alternative communication channels when they do not release
open letters.
The above arguments suggest that the relation between open letters and activism out-
comes is ambiguous, leading to our third hypothesis, stated in the null:
H3: Activists’ open letters are not associated with activism outcomes.
We next test managerial response to activists’ open letters. Specifically, we follow Jung
and Kwon (1988, p. 147), who predict that the public disclosures of third parties can trigger
managers’ reaction function, thus leading to “the release of information that would otherwise
be withheld by managers.” The logic is that managers may seek to ameliorate any potentially
unfavorable consequences of third-party disclosures. This is a salient feature of our setting
because many open letters explicitly raise concerns about the competency of managers (see
Appendix 1 for examples).
To illustrate managerial response in our setting, consider the following excerpt from
eBay’s response to Carl Icahn’s open letter that criticized eBay10:
eBay Inc. Responds to Carl Icahn’s Feb. 24 Open Letter to Stock-
holders. New eBay shareholder Carl Icahn has cherry-picked old news clips and
anecdotes out of context to attack the integrity of two of the most respected,
accomplished and value-driven technology leaders in Silicon Valley. Marc An-
dreessen and Scott Cook bring extraordinary insight, expertise and leadership
to eBay’s board, which is scrupulous in its governance practices and fully trans-
parent with regard to its directors’ other affiliations and businesses. And eBay
Inc. President and CEO John Donahoe is widely respected for his turnaround
of eBay and leadership of the company over the past six years. As we are sure
our other shareholders would agree, we prefer to engage in more constructive and
substantive discussions of why, in our view, PayPal and eBay are better together.
Instead, Mr. Icahn unfortunately has resorted to mudslinging attacks against two
impeccably qualified directors.
The above example notwithstanding, managers may not systematically respond to ac-
tivists’ open letters if they do not view activists’ letters as credible threats to their firms or
10See the following DEFA14A filing for eBay’s full response: https://goo.gl/u4CWzu.
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careers. Managers may also resort solely to private negotiations with the activist or may
disregard the activist so as not to expand the scope of monitoring by the board and other
investors (e.g., Adams and Ferreira, 2007). Another possibility is that the benefit to man-
agers of responding might not exceed any proprietary disclosure cost, or some other private
benefit of not responding (e.g., Bernard, 2016). For example, managers may wish to main-
tain their private information advantage or to extract personal benefits from nondisclosure,
as when their compensation is linked to stock price (e.g., Nagar et al., 2003). Also, more
disclosure may facilitate litigation or further advantage activists (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia,
1994; Kothari et al., 2009).
These considerations lead to our final hypothesis, stated in the null:
H4: Managers do not respond to activists’ open letters with disclosures of their own.
3 Overview of Data
We identify activists’ open letters by using Dow Jones Factiva to search a variety of
media outlets. Our reading of these letters suggests that virtually all of them are aimed at
a target’s board, management, or other shareholders—or some combination of these. We
therefore use the following search form in Factiva: (“public letter” or “in a letter” or “open
letter” or “in a recent letter” or “in its letter” or “sent a letter” or “wrote a letter” or “filed
a letter” or “issued a letter” or “delivered a letter” or “released a letter” or “to a letter sent”
or “their letter”) not (“buffett” or “obama”).11 Our sources include Barron’s, Bloomberg,
Business Wire, Financial Times, The New York Times, and The Wall Street Journal. To
ensure our analysis has enough statistical power, our coverage period is January 1, 2012 to
December 31, 2014.
Our search yields 15,485 articles, almost all of which are unrelated to our setting. We
therefore read the articles to isolate activists’ open letters and their release dates. Our
11We eliminate from our search “buffett” and “obama” because we are not interested in Warren Buffett’s
annual letters to Berkshire Hathaway shareholders, nor the numerous letters that are sent to former president
Barack Obama and covered by the media.
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final sample consists of 264 open letters. Our sample is limited to 2012 to 2014 due to the
considerable time that it takes to hand screen the letters. However, our sample size compares
well to many other studies in the literature. To provide a few examples, McCahery et al.
(2016) use a sample of 143, Klein and Zur (2009) use a sample of 151, and Schwartz-Ziv
and Weisbach (2013) use a sample of 247. Also, in a study that is similar in spirit to ours,
Ljungqvist and Qian (2016) use a sample of 124 reports released by short sellers.
To analyze whether activists’ open letters correspond to a target firm’s stock price move-
ments, information asymmetry, and disclosures, we manually link our sample to CRSP,
Compustat, and I/B/E/S. We lose 9 observations that cannot be linked to all three of these
databases.
For our returns analyses in H1, we compute abnormal returns as raw firm returns minus
value-weighted market returns over our respective return intervals. We find similar results
when we adjust raw firm returns by equal-weighted market returns, when we use raw firm
returns, and when we compute various factor-based alphas (e.g., Hutton et al., 2003, fn. 19).
To measure information asymmetry for H2, we follow prior studies and use DTAQ ab-
normal percent bid-ask spreads to approximate the information asymmetry component of
spreads (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Holden and Jacobsen, 2014). Foucault et al. (2013,
p. 80) note that spreads are comprised of three components, including (1) the cost of
trading with better informed investors, (2) the cost of holding stock in inventory, and (3)
order-processing costs. Our primary interest is components (1) and (2), which are driven
primarily by information asymmetry in trade (Foucault et al., 2013, Section 3.2.2). That
is, market makers’ trading losses and losses on holding inventory both increase when they
trade with better informed investors, as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985). By contrast, order-
processing costs are driven by settlement fees, trading technology, and competition in dealer
markets, all of which are relatively stable from year to year (Foucault et al., 2013, Section
3.2.2). Thus, since (3) is relatively stable over time and (1) and (2) are driven primarily by
information asymmetry in trade, we use abnormal spreads—or spreads relative to a tempo-
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rally close control period—in our regressions. Our control period is [−60, −30 days], where
day 0 is the release date of the open letter. Accordingly, we compute percent quoted spreads
as follows:
Percent Spreadsft = 100 ×
Askft −Bidft
(Askft + Bidft)/2
, (1)
where index f represents a target firm, and index t represents the day.
For each firm-day value, we follow Holden and Jacobsen (2014) and use the time-weighted
percent quoted spread computed during trading hours. We find qualitatively and statistically
similar results when we use DTAQ effective percent spreads and percent spreads computed
from CRSP data. For each respective window over which we measure spreads, we compute
the arithmetic mean value of Percent Spreadsft. We then subtract from this value the mean
value of Percent Spreadsft over the interval of [−60, −30 days] to arrive at our measure of
abnormal spreads for a target firm, Percent Spreadsi.
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To analyze whether open letters correspond to activism outcomes for H3, we manually
link each open letter to SharkRepellent, a corporate governance database maintained by
FactSet Research Systems and Thomson Reuters. This comprehensive database records all
activism campaigns at publicly traded U.S.-headquartered companies (regardless of industry
and firm size) and provides accompanying campaign outcomes. Since not all of our open
letters pertain to U.S.-headquartered companies, we can link only 203 of our observations
to SharkRepellent. However, this only affects our analysis of H3. We still include some
SharkRepellent data in our analyses for H1, H2, and H4. To do this without losing any
observations, we follow Khanna et al. (2015, p. 1230) and create an indicator variable that
equals one for observations that do not link to SharkRepellent, in which case we also set the
SharkRepellent variables equal to zero (see Section 4). Our inferences are similar when we
exclude observations that do not link to SharkRepellent.
12We find similar results when we log transform one plus spreads.
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For completeness, we include five measures of campaign success: (1) whether the activist
wins a proxy contest at a target, (2) whether the activist attains a directorship at a target,
(3) whether the activist achieves governance or strategic demands at a target, (4) whether
the activist receives the recommendation of ISS or Glass Lewis, and (5) whether the activist
successfully elicits a special shareholder meeting. Note that SharkRepellent defines “gover-
nance or strategic demands” as any governance or corporate operating decision that traces
to an activist’s agenda. As Appendix 1 shows, open letters can make many demands—one
letter in our sample makes over 50. Our five activism outcomes only summarily capture
significant changes in a target, which we consider a conservative approach.
To measure managerial response to activists’ open letters for H4, we use disclosure filings
from the WRDS SEC Analytics database. Our first measure is the frequency of 8-K press
releases. Companies typically file press releases in voluntary 8-K items 2, 7, 8, and 9; we
therefore limit our analysis to these 8-Ks (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Lerman and Livnat,
2010). However, we find similar results when we include all 8-Ks, which suggests our results
are not driven by mandatory 8-K filings, which include those pertaining to a change in
auditor, a change in shell company status, as well as other actions.13
Our second measure of disclosure for H4 is the frequency of amendments to DEF 14A
filings, or DEFA14A filings. DEF 14A filings represent proxy materials that are filed annually
by all public companies. DEFA14A are voluntary amendments to the DEF 14A that can
include additional information that is relevant to the proxy materials, including managers’
views on activists’ actions (see Section 4.5 and fn. 10 for an example).
To construct our 8-K measure of disclosure, ∆ 8-K Filingsi, we compute the number
of 8-K filings over the post period of [0, +90 days] minus the number of 8-K filings over
the control pre period of [−365, −275 days]. This control pre period represents the [0,+90
days] period from the prior year, which accounts for the possibility that 8-K filings follow a
13See http://www.sec.gov/answers/form8k.htm for more detail. Several recent studies also use 8-Ks,
including Balakrishnan et al. (2014), Bozanic et al. (2018), Guay et al. (2016), Schoenfeld (2017), and Shroff
et al. (2017).
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calendar-time pattern. We also use [−90, −1 day] as an alternate control period.
To construct our DEFA14A measure of disclosure, ∆ DEFA14A Filingsi, we compute
the number of DEFA14A filings over [0, +90 days] minus the number of DEFA14A filings
over [−365, −275 days]. Since DEFA14A filings follow a strict calendar-time pattern based
on when firms release proxy materials (which is typically stable from year to year), the
prior year control window is the strongest and most appropriate control window for our
test. Our decision to use 90-day windows for both of our disclosure measures is motivated
in part by Guay et al. (2016, p. 250), who argue that managers need time (up to 90 days in
their analysis) to observe investors’ interpretation of new information and build a response.
Nonetheless, our inferences are qualitatively similar when we decrease the 90-day window to
60 and 30 days.
We also include a set of control variables. These variables include log of market value
of equity, since firm size has been linked to returns and spreads (e.g., Chordia et al., 2008;
Fama and French, 2004); ROA, since profitability has been linked to disclosure (e.g., Beyer
et al., 2010); R&D and capital expenditures, since target firms more active in these activities
could have more information to disclose; analyst following and institutional ownership, since
institutions and analysts might affect disclosure (e.g., Bushee and Noe, 2000; Lang and
Lundholm, 1996); and cash holdings, which could proxy for agency conflicts and thus affect
how investors and managers respond to activists’ open letters (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997,
p. 746). We also include SharkRepellent’s proprietary “BulletProof” measure of managerial
entrenchment at a target, since managerial entrenchment might decrease both the likelihood
that an activist’s campaign succeeds and the credibility of the open letter.14
We also include activist-level attributes. These variables include the activist’s ownership
level in a target, since this may correspond to whether an activist’s open letter is credible.
We also include activist AUM, since increased AUM could represent the activist’s reputation
in the market. The idea is that absent a strong reputation, investors would not invest in the
14This variable increases with managerial entrenchment, similar to the E-index in Bebchuk et al. (2009).
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activist to such an extent, which implies that AUM is at least a partial signal of the activist’s
reputation. Reputation in our setting could also be viewed through the lens of management,
who might view more AUM as representing an activist’s ability to enact his or her agenda
because he or she has more resources to run a campaign.
In our regressions of spreads, we also include abnormal turnover, where turnover is mea-
sured as trading volume divided by shares outstanding (Chordia et al., 2000, 2001). This
helps to ensure that our results are not driven by any trading activities that may be unrelated
to the open letters. We also find qualitatively and statistically similar results for spreads
when we control for abnormal dollar-value turnover, abnormal log of trading volume, and
squared returns in place of turnover (e.g., Holden et al., 2013).
Note that including the above regressors is unlikely to significantly affect our analyses
of spreads and disclosure because our use of control periods in effect yields firm-fixed-effect
regressions, which mostly eliminate persistent firm-specific factors such as industry mem-
bership. However, we still use these regressors to perform important static cross-sectional
analyses of our results (e.g., size effects, etc.).
Also, since our control periods for spreads and disclosure are temporally close to activists’
open letter dates, this procedure mostly eliminates the impact of any macro trends in spreads
and disclosure that affect all firms. All variables are winsorized at the two percent level except
for indicator variables. Variables that have a natural lower bound of zero (e.g., analyst
following) are winsorized from the top only. All of our results are qualitatively similar when
we do not winsorize and when we winsorize at the 5 percent level. For the regressions, we
standardize the independent variables in order to facilitate interpretation of the intercept
(see Section 4). We provide the exact equations for all of our variables in Appendix 2.
15
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Univariate Statistics
Our sample period ranges from January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2014 and includes 255
activist open letters. As Table 1, Panel A shows, the mean market value of target firms in
our sample is about $20.7 billion; in sum, our sample covers target firms valued at about
$527.9 billion. The mean target in our sample has −0.1 percent ROA, an analyst following
of about 2, and institutional ownership of about 56.8 percent. The average activist in our
sample oversees $8.2 billion in assets under management (AUM) and owns about 5.7 percent
of target companies’ common stock. On average, activists release open letters about 57 days
after they announce their campaign, which suggests that our returns results are not mixing
with returns around the announcement of the activist campaign.15
On average and at the median, our unsigned and signed CAR measures are all positive,
our abnormal spread measures are all negative, and our 8-K and DEFA14A measures are both
positive. These findings provide initial evidence that activists’ open letters are informative
to investors, decrease investor information asymmetry, and elicit a disclosure response from
managers. We assess these findings using multivariate specifications in the sections that
follow.
Table 1, Panel B shows that all year-quarters in our sample are well represented. Within
year, activists’ open letters occur most frequently in quarter one, an expected outcome given
that proxy voting occurs for most firms in the spring. Table 1, Panel C shows that all 12
Fama-French industry groups are also well represented, with the most frequent industries
being business equipment, wholesale/retail, health care, and finance. In sum, our sample
represents a diverse cross-section of activists and target firms over several years.
15Campaign announcement dates (but not open letter dates) are available in SharkRepellent for the 203
firms to which we can match our hand-collected sample. In Section 4.2, we directly rule out confounding
information events using a comprehensive database of corporate disclosures and analyst reports.
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4.2 Stock Price Reaction to Activists’ Open Letters
We next test H1 by linking activists’ open letters to target firm CARs around the release
date of the open letters. We use a variety of return intervals to ensure that we fully capture
investor response to the letter. We do not use intraday returns because we do not have
second- or minute-level timestamps for the open letters.
First, we use the day 0 CAR, which best mitigates any potential influence of other
information events. We then widen our CAR interval to [−1,+1 day] and [−5,+5 days].
This ensures that investors have enough time to process and trade on the open letters and
follows prior studies on corporate disclosure, most of which give investors at least several
days to react to information releases (e.g., Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Hutton et al., 2003).
Likewise, activism studies typically analyze returns to the announcement of activism using
return windows of up to 20 days (e.g., Brav et al., 2008; Klein and Zur, 2009). We show
shortly that our returns results are not confounded by the announcement of the activism
campaign.
We start with unsigned CARs. Unsigned returns are used extensively in the literature
when the direction of the return around an information event is ex ante ambiguous (e.g.,
Bushee et al., 2010; Matsumoto et al., 2011). Accordingly, in Table 2, Columns 1 to 3,
we regress unsigned CARs on target-firm-level and activist-level attributes. Since we are
interested in the intercept term (or mean effect) and many of our independent variables never
equal zero in our sample, we standardize the independent variables (but not the dependent
variables). This considerably simplifies the interpretation of the intercept by eliminating the
need to make a series of computational corrections (we apply the same procedure to the
spread and disclosure regressions that follow). At the same time, this approach enables us
to test whether our static regressors are associated with the values of our CARs (e.g., any
size effect, etc.).
In Table 2, Column 1, we find that the day 0 unsigned CAR is 2.2 percent (or 220
17
basis points; 1% level).16 When we widen the interval in Columns 2 and 3 to [−1,+1 day]
and [−5,+5 days], the magnitude of the intercept increases to 4.0 percent and 5.8 percent,
respectively (1% level for both). Taken together, these findings suggest that open letters are
informative to investors, but they do not speak to the direction of investors’ belief revisions.
Turning to signed returns in Table 2, Columns 4 to 6, the day 0 CAR is +1.3 percent,
the [−1,+1 day] CAR is +2.4 percent, and the [−5,+5 days] CAR is +3.5 percent (1% level
for all). Investors thus appear to view open letters as favorable signals for a target. To the
extent this finding is driven by investor support for the content in the open letters, we next
assess whether this finding is more pronounced when an activist’s reputation is stronger.
Interestingly, the magnitudes of both the unsigned and signed CARs are increasing in the
activist’s AUM, which is our proxy for the activist’s reputation. This finding suggests that
activists’ reputations increase investor response to their open letters. One interpretation of
this result is that either the credibility or the quality of an activist’s open letter is in part a
function of his or her reputation in the market for corporate control.
Among the other regressors, a target’s market value is negatively associated with the
CARs. One explanation for this result is that the credibility of open letters decreases in
larger firms for which it is more expensive for the activist to enact change (Edmans and
Holderness, 2017, Section 3). Another possibility is that larger firms have richer public
information environments to begin with, thereby making it costlier for the activist to acquire
a considerable information advantage over other investors (e.g., Anilowski et al., 2007; Fama
and French, 1995). An activist’s ownership level is also negatively associated with the CARs.
One interpretation of this result is that activists reveal less information through open letters
in circumstances where they demand less support from other investors, i.e., when activists
have more explicit control rights in a target.
To put the magnitudes of the above results into context, Khorana et al. (2017, Figure
16As noted in Section 3, we compute CARs as firm returns minus value-weighted market returns over the
respective return intervals. However, we find similar results when we use equal-weighted market returns,
when we use raw firm returns, and when we compute various alphas. We are not interested in creating
trading strategies for activists’ open letters.
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2) find that the initial announcement of activist campaigns from 2012 to 2014 is associated
with a CAR of +6.23 percent. Brav et al. (2008) find that the announcement of hedge
fund activism from 2001 to 2006 is associated with a CAR of +7.0 percent. Barclay and
Holderness (1991) find that block trades from 1978 to 1982 are associated with a CAR of
+5.6 percent. Our signed returns are not quite as large in magnitude as these findings,
but they still suggest that activists’ open letters are informative to investors. For another
comparison, “good news” management earnings forecasts are associated with a +1.93 percent
CAR, and “bad news” management earnings forecasts are associated with a −9.96 percent
CAR (Hutton et al., 2003). We next ensure that our returns results are not driven by
confounding information events such as the announcement of the activist campaign.
We focus specifically on unsigned and signed returns for the [−1,+1 day] window, as this
provides us with several days over which we can check for confounding information events.
To compile a comprehensive data set of information events, we first merge the full WRDS
SEC Analytics database with the I/B/E/S management guidance and I/B/E/S earnings
announcements databases. Note that the WRDS SEC Analytics database includes virtually
all SEC filings by public companies, as well as 13Ds, 13Gs, and 13Fs. We also merge
in the I/B/E/S financial analyst databases, including those for analyst earnings forecasts,
price targets, and stock recommendations. This gives us a comprehensive set of potentially
confounding information events, including (but not limited to) 10-K filings, 10-Q filings, 8-K
filings, 13D filings, management guidance, and analysts’ earnings forecasts. This approach
also accounts for earnings calls, virtually all of which occur on earnings announcement days
that will be identified by I/B/E/S earnings announcements.
We find that only nine of our observations have one or more confounding information
events in the [−1,+1 day] window around the open letter release date. Our returns results are
qualitatively and statistically similar when we drop these observations from our regressions.
When we use the window of [−5,+5 days], we find that 46 of our observations have one or
more confounding information events. When we drop these 46 observations from our [−1,+1
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day] and [−5,+5 days] CAR regressions, we again find qualitatively and statistically similar
results. For the activist open letters that match to SharkRepellent, we find that these open
letters are released on average about 57 days after activist campaign announcement dates,
which suggests that the announcement of the campaign is likely not driving our results.
Nonetheless, we find similar [−1,+1 day] results when we drop the 21 observations that fall
within 5 days of the announcement date. Collectively, these findings suggest that our returns
results are in fact driven by activists’ open letters.
We also perform placebo tests to ensure that activists’ open letters are not released during
periods in which all of our target firms are experiencing significant price movements over
extended periods. We assign to each open letter two new release dates, one that is 90 days
before its actual release date, and one that is 90 days after its actual release date. We then
re-run our day 0 and [−1,+1 day] returns regressions and do not find significant results for
any of these tests. This provides additional confidence that our returns results are driven by
activists’ open letters.
4.3 Activists’ Open Letters and Investor Information Asymmetry
Theory suggests that to the extent activists release part of their private information
through open letters, this can change investors’ beliefs about the mean levels and the priced
covariances of a target’s future payoffs. This is what the previous section tested using
returns. However, theory also suggests that such private information revelation by activists
may decrease adverse selection in the market for firm shares. This effect can be tested directly
by analyzing a target’s bid-ask spread (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985). We therefore next
examine H2 by testing whether activists’ open letters are associated with spreads.
We analyze abnormal percent spreads for day 0, [−1,+1 day], and [−5,+5 days], where
day 0 is the release date of an activist’s open letter.17 Our control period is [−60, −30 days].
To illustrate how we compute abnormal spreads for the [−1,+1 day] window, we compute a
17As we discuss in Section 3, our use of abnormal spreads to proxy for information asymmetry follows
prior literature.
20
target firm’s mean percent spread over the [−1,+1 day] window and subtract from this the
mean percent spread over the [−60, −30 days] window. This procedure is similar to using
firm-fixed effects, in that it mostly eliminates any persistent firm-level factors that might
be driving spreads (e.g., industry membership). Also, since the control period is temporally
close to the open letter date, this procedure mostly eliminates any macro trends in spreads
that affect all firms. We provide our exact equations in Appendix 2.
In Table 3, we regress abnormal percent spreads on target-firm and activist attributes.
Note again that since we are interested in the intercept term and many of our independent
variables never equal zero in our sample, we standardize the independent variables (but not
the dependent variables). This considerably simplifies the interpretation of the intercept
term. At the same time, we recognize that our dependent variables are differenced, whereas
some of our independent variables are in their level forms. This approach enables us to
analyze static cross-sectional effects such as firm size, ROA, and cash holdings—measures
that are not as amenable to differencing over our short windows. However, we do include
differenced independent variables for other determinants of spreads such as share turnover.
In Table 3, Column 1, we find that day 0 abnormal spreads are −0.013 percentage points
(1% level). The interpretation is that the mean percent spread on day 0 decreases by 0.013
percentage points from its mean value in the control period of [−60, −30 days]. In Column
2, we find that [−1,+1 day] abnormal spreads are −0.017 percentage points (1% level), and
in Column 3, we find that [−5,+5 days] abnormal spreads are −0.012 percentage points
(1% level). Overall, these findings are consistent with the idea that activists release part
of their private information through open letters, thus decreasing information asymmetry
among investors in the target.
Among the controls, log of market value is also significantly positively associated with
abnormal spreads across the three tests, which suggests that open letters impact spreads
less in larger firms. Similar to Section 4.2, this could be due to the fact that larger firms
generally have richer information environments to begin with, which may increase the cost
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for the activist to acquire an information advantage over other investors (e.g., Fama and
French, 1995). We do not find a significant cross-sectional effect for activist reputation as
proxied for by AUM.
We also perform a set of checks for confounding information events. As identified in
the prior section, we drop nine observations that have one or more confounding information
events in the [−1,+1 day] window, as well as the 21 observations that fall within 5 days
of the activist campaign announcement date. Also, if the activist campaign announcement
date falls within the [−60, −30 days] control pre period for spreads, then we remove the
[−5,+5 days] window around the campaign announcement date from the control pre period.
Our spreads results are qualitatively and statistically similar for all of these analyses. We
then drop the 46 observations that have one or more confounding information event in the
[−5,+5 days] window. We again find similar results for the day 0, [−1,+1 day], and [−5,+5
days] tests. We also find similar results when we include as a regressor contemporaneous
abnormal spreads averaged over all other firms in a target’s SIC industry. This regressor in
effect serves as a set of control firms, which suggests that we are not capturing an unrelated
pattern in spreads that is common to firms similar to the target.18
We also perform a placebo test to ensure that activists’ open letters are not systematically
released during periods in which target firms are experiencing decreased spreads. We assign
to each open letter two new release dates, one that is 90 days before its actual release date,
and one that is 90 days after its actual release date. We then re-run our day 0 and [−1,+1
day] spreads regressions and do not find significant results for these tests. This finding
increases our confidence that our information asymmetry results are driven by activists’
open letters.
18This approach follows Bertrand et al. (2004) and is similar to that in Cheng et al. (2004, Table 10).
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4.4 Activists’ Open Letters and Campaign Outcomes
We next test H3 by checking whether activists’ open letters are associated with activist
campaign outcomes. Our motivation is that to the extent activists’ open letters persuade
(or convince) other shareholders to support their agenda, activists’ open letters should cor-
respond to the outcomes of activist campaigns. For example, if activists’ open letters compel
other shareholders to vote for activist-sponsored directors, then open letters should be asso-
ciated with activist directorship wins.
In Table 4, we tabulate our activist campaign success variables. We include five measures
of campaign success: (1) whether the activist wins a proxy contest at a target, (2) whether
the activist attains a directorship at a target, (3) whether the activist achieves governance
or strategic demands at a target, (4) whether the activist receives the recommendation of
ISS or Glass Lewis, and (5) whether the activist successfully elicits a special shareholder
meeting.19 Note that these measures depend directly on the success of the given campaign
initiative. For example, we are not interested in whether the activist ran a proxy contest,
but in whether the activist won a proxy contest.
To analyze whether activists’ open letters impact these outcomes, ideally we would assign
activists to release open letters at random, but this is infeasible. A second-best alternative
is to match activist campaigns with open letters to activist campaigns without open letters.
In this respect, Brav et al. (2008, p. 1751) and Klein and Zur (2011, p. 1742) recommend
matching on industry and firm value.20
Accordingly, we match our 203 activist campaigns with open letters and SharkRepellent
data (our treatment sample) to 203 activist campaigns without open letters (our control sam-
ple) using nearest-neighbor matching by industry and firm value, without replacement; i.e.,
19As Section 3 notes, SharkRepellent defines “governance or strategic demands” as any governance or
corporate operating decision that traces to an activist’s agenda.
20Brav et al. (2008) and Klein and Zur (2011) are interested in matching hedge fund targets to non-hedge
fund targets in order to compute the treatment effects of hedge fund activism. They recognize that there
are no strong instruments for becoming a hedge fund target. Edmans and Holderness (2017, p. 542-543)
similarly argue that there are no credible instruments for the actions of activists.
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we sort by industry and then by firm value. Both sets of firms must link to SharkRepellent
so that we can obtain data on our five activist campaign outcome variables.
After matching, we then statistically compare activist campaign outcomes across the
treatment and control samples. We do not mean to imply causality with our use of the
terms “treatment sample” and “treatment effect.” We use these terms only to simplify our
discussion.
We provide our results in Table 4. We find that when an activist releases an open letter,
the likelihood that the activist wins a proxy contest increases by 25.39 percentage points (1%
level), the likelihood that the activist attains a directorship at a target increases by 11.24
percentage points (10% level), the likelihood that the activist achieves governance or strategic
demands at a target increases by 35.50 percentage points (1% level), the likelihood that the
activist receives the recommendation of ISS or Glass Lewis increases by 25.39 percentage
points (1% level), and the likelihood that the activist successfully elicits a special shareholder
meeting increases by 7.84 percentage points (10% level). One interesting anecdote from our
results is that when Starboard targeted Darden in 2014, ISS and Glass Lewis cited passages
from Starboard’s open letter as justification for their recommending Starboard’s directors.
Taken together, these findings are consistent with the idea that activists’ open letters serve
to facilitate the activist’s goals at a target.
There are caveats to these results due to the fact that we cannot isolate a strong in-
strument for activists’ open letters. Foremost, we cannot fully rule out the possibility that
activists release open letters when they anticipate that their campaigns will succeed. Indeed,
our relatively large treatment effects suggest that this mechanism is likely operating in our
setting at least somewhat. Thus, our findings should not be construed as the causal effect
of activists’ open letters on activist campaign outcomes. Instead, our empirical focus is on
the circumstances in which it is optimal for activists to release their open letters, given the
costs of influencing a target and its investors by other means. Nonetheless, this analysis is
still important because if we discovered negative or no treatment effects in Table 4, this may
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suggest that activists release open letters primarily to manipulate a target’s stock price or
to achieve some other goal. Our evidence does not support this argument.
4.5 Manager Reaction to Activists’ Open Letters
We next examine H4 by testing managers’ disclosure response to activists’ open letters,
focusing specifically on managers’ 8-K and DEFA14A filings. We count 8-K filings in the [0,
+90 days] post period and subtract from this value the count of 8-K filings in the control pre
period of [−365, −275 days], where day 0 is the release date of an activist’s open letter. This
control period represents the [0, +90 days] period from the prior year, which helps to ensure
that our results are not driven by calendar-time patterns in 8-K filings. This procedure
yields the ∆ 8-K Filingsi dependent variable in Table 5, Column 1.
As in Sections 4.2 and 4.3, we standardize the independent variables, which simplifies
the interpretation of the intercept term. We again recognize that our dependent variables
are differenced, whereas some of our independent variables are in their level forms. This
approach enables us to analyze static cross-sectional effects such as firm size, ROA, insti-
tutional ownership, and cash holdings—measures that are not as amenable to differencing
over our short windows.
Table 5, Column 1 shows that 8-K filings increase by about 1.404 from the pre to the post
period on average (1% level).21 This finding suggests that managers respond to activists’
open letters by releasing additional 8-Ks. Moreover, this finding is more pronounced for
targets with lower ROA, which suggests that these targets are more sensitive to activists’
open letters. This is consistent with Brav et al. (2008), who find that activists target low ROA
firms more frequently. This finding is also more pronounced for targets with high institutional
ownership. This is consistent with Appel et al. (2016), who argue that institutional investors
may serve as important partners to activists, thus increasing the pressure on managers to
21Most press releases are included in voluntary 8-K items 2, 7, 8, and 9. As a result, we limit our analysis
to these 8-Ks. However, we find virtually identical results when we include all 8-Ks. We discuss this point
in more detail in Section 3 and fn. 13.
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respond to an activist.
In Table 5, Column 2, we re-run the regression from Column 1 except that we use [−90,
−1 day] as the control period for 8-K filings. We find that 8-K filings increase by about 1 in
the post period relative to the pre period (1% level), which is still economically meaningful
but lower in magnitude than the result in Column 1. This finding suggests that any calendar-
time patterns in 8-K filings are not driving our results. As in Column 1, this finding is also
more pronounced for firms with low ROA, attesting to the robustness of this result. Overall,
our findings for 8-Ks suggest that managers are responding to activists’ open letters with
disclosure of their own.22
We next analyze our second managerial disclosure measure, DEFA14A filings. DEFA14A
filings are voluntary amendments to the DEF 14A that managers can use to disclose any
additional information that is relevant to the annual proxy materials, including managers’
views on activists.23 Some investors can also file DEFA14As, but because our focus is
managers’ response, we do not include these in our analysis.
DEFA14A filings follow a calendar-time pattern based on the date when firms release
their proxy materials, which is typically stable from year to year. As a result, we compute
the count of DEFA14A filings in the [0, +90 days] post period and subtract from this value
the count of DEFA14A filings in the control pre period of [−365, −275 days], where day
0 is the activists’ open letter date. We find that DEFA14A filings increase by about 3.485
from the pre to the post period (1% level). This finding suggests that managers respond to
activists’ open letters by increasing their frequency of DEFA14A filings.
Among the control variables, this finding is more pronounced for larger firms, who tend
to disclose more regardless and who might have more experienced investor relations staff
(Anilowski et al., 2007; Bushee and Miller, 2012, p. 45). Capital expenditures are negatively
associated with managers’ disclosure response perhaps due to proprietary costs, although
22Our focus is the information content of activists’ open letters, so we do not perform market tests
on managers’ 8-Ks. However, prior research has established that 8-Ks are informative to investors (e.g.,
Balakrishnan et al., 2014; Lerman and Livnat, 2010; Schoenfeld, 2017).
23For an example of a firm’s response to an activist’s open letter in a DEFA14A filing, see fn. 10.
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this effect is economically small (Bernard, 2016). Overall, our findings suggest that man-
agers respond to activists’ open letters through increased disclosure of their own, specifically
through 8-K and DEFA14A filings.
Our use of 90-day windows for both 8-Ks and DEFA14As ensures that managers have
enough time to respond. Indeed, Guay et al. (2016, Section 5.3) argue that changing disclo-
sure policy can take up to 90 days because managers need to observe investors’ interpretation
of new information and build a response. Nonetheless, our inferences are qualitatively similar
when we decrease the 90-day window to 60 and 30 days.
As we noted for spreads in Section 4.3, our approach of using changes in 8-Ks and
DEFA14As is similar to using firm-fixed effects, in that it mostly eliminates any persistent
firm-level factors that may be driving both types of filings (e.g., industry membership). Also,
since the control pre period is temporally close to the activist open letter date, this procedure
likely eliminates any macro trends in 8-Ks and DEFA14As that affect all firms. Nevertheless,
we also find similar results when we include as a regressor contemporaneous changes in 8-Ks
and DEFA14As averaged over all other firms in a target’s SIC industry. This regressor in
effect serves as a set of control firms, which suggests that we are not capturing a general
pattern in disclosure that is common to firms similar to a target.
We also perform several placebo tests to ensure that our results are not spurious. For
8-Ks, we run the same test in Table 5, Column 1, except that we move back activists’ open
letter dates by 182 days and 365 days. We also move forward activists’ open letter dates
by 182 days and 547 days. For DEFA14As, we run the same test in Table 5, Column 3,
except that we move back activists’ open letter dates by 365 days and 730 days. We also
move forward activists’ open letter dates by 730 days. Note that moving the open letter
date forward by 365 days does not work for either 8-Ks or DEFA14As, because then the
control period would overlay the actual post period. Also, recall that DEFA14As follow an
annual calendar-time pattern, so we must go back and forward in one-year increments. In
any event, we do not find significant changes in either of the filings for any of these placebo
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tests, which suggests that our findings in Table 5 are being driven by activists’ open letters.
This increases our confidence that managers are responding to activists’ open letters through
increased disclosure of their own, thereby creating a public debate about their firm’s future.
5 Conclusion
Voluntary disclosure is a key driver of many stock price properties and investor activities
(e.g., Verrecchia, 2001). Verrecchia (1983) predicts that managers’ voluntary disclosures are
typically induced by compensation contracts based on outcomes such as stock price. Em-
pirical research has therefore linked voluntary disclosure to managerial stock compensation
(e.g., Nagar et al., 2003). However, Jung and Kwon (1988) predict that managers’ voluntary
disclosures can also be induced by the informative disclosures of third parties. Relatedly,
Beyer et al. (2010, Section 1) and Verrecchia (2001) suggest that the management disclosure
literature can be extended to the economic consequences of the disclosures of other parties.
We therefore empirically assess corporate governance theories that model activist share-
holders as investors who may use public disclosure to mitigate information asymmetry among
investors about their agenda (e.g., Cohn and Rajan, 2013; Harris and Raviv, 2010). We find
that activists’ open letters are associated with significant stock price movements, decreased
bid-ask spreads, and key activism outcomes such as proxy contests, directorships, and proxy
advisor recommendations. Managers respond to activists’ open letters through increased
voluntary disclosure of their own. Overall, our collective evidence suggests that activists use
open letters to decrease information asymmetry among investors.
There are several avenues for future research on this subject. Disclosure studies often
analyze either an economic agent’s decision to disclose or the economic consequences of
disclosure. We follow the management disclosure literature and first test for key economic
consequences of activists’ disclosures (e.g., Waymire, 1984). Given our findings, future re-
search could further analyze activists’ disclosure strategies. Our matched-sample analysis
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is an initial step in this direction. Our study also focuses on activist shareholders in pub-
lic companies, but one could conceivably extend our study to other market participants
and asset classes, and to how managers respond. Future research could also examine other
mechanisms by which shareholders communicate (e.g., Doidge et al., 2017).
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Appendix 1: Illustrations of Activist Open Letters from 2012 to 2014
This appendix showcases excerpts from 10 activist open letters randomly selected from our sample. A letter’s release date
follows each excerpt, and the activist’s name appears in parentheses.
1. “AN OPEN LETTER TO AGRIUM SHAREHOLDERS: Why We Said No to the Status Quo at Agrium, and Why You Should Too. . . Dear Fellow Agrium Inc.
Shareholder, We have invested more than $1 billion in Agrium, making us the largest shareholder with approximately 6.5% of its outstanding shares, because we believe
Agrium can generate substantial additional upside for all shareholders by addressing 5 core issues: Costs, Controls, Capital Allocation, Conglomerate Structure and
Corporate Governance.. . . Agrium has sought to turn traditional notions of board oversight of management upside down by making any questioning of management’s prior
performance or strategy a disqualification for board service.. . . We further note that Agrium did not cast a very wide net to locate new board appointee Mayo Schmidt,
given that Viterra’s distribution business was acquired by Agrium in a transaction in which he earned over C$30MM. We also note that our board nominees stand to
benefit only to the extent that all shareholders benefit and each meets the definition of ’Independence’ under the CBCA, NYSE rules, and Agrium’s own governance
guidelines.. . . Neither of Agrium’s chosen new directors addresses the board’s lack of distribution experience, which is of crucial importance given the size of Agrium’s
Retail business.” February 20, 2013 (JANA Partners)
2. “To the Board of Directors of Allergan: In my 21-year history as a governance investor, I cannot think of another example in our portfolio where a board has behaved as
poorly as you have in your response to the Valeant merger proposal. Your scorched earth response to Valeant is beyond the pale. You have accused Valeant of fraudulent
accounting and of falsifying its reported growth rates and business performance, and you have done so without factual evidence to prove these assertions. If one spreads
false and misleading information for the purpose of driving down Valeant’s stock price, that is market manipulation, plain and simple. That a board of a $50 billion
market cap company would engage in such behavior as a defensive tactic is extraordinary and incredibly inappropriate.. . . We would have expected more from you based
on your personal career track records up until this time, and what we have heard about some of you from individuals we know in common. I had hoped that your initial
approach to this transaction was an ill-advised negotiating strategy, but the passage of time and your continued misinformation campaign about Valeant have caused us
to conclude that you are no longer fit to serve the interests of shareholders. As a result, we have recruited a group of extremely talented executives and experienced public
company directors who understand their fiduciary duties and have a track record of acting in the best interest of shareholders and the companies they have managed as
CEOs and as members of their boards of directors.” July 16, 2014 (Pershing Square Capital Management, LP)
3. “The following has occurred: shareholders have been told that Mr. Thompson’s errors were ‘Inadvertent’, Mr. Thompson made a classic ‘I’m sorry you feel that way’
non-apology without actually accepting responsibility, Ms. Hart announced she will not seek re-election to the Board presumably due to her leadership of the botched
CEO hiring process but intends to serve out her term, and the Board has formed a special committee to conduct a ‘Thorough review’ into Mr. Thompson’s academic
credentials.. . . Mr. Thompson’s ‘Apology’ was clearly insufficient and it seems that the only thing he actually regrets is that he has been caught in a lie and publicly
exposed. After six days, we must ask - what is this Board waiting for? It seems farcical to us that the Board will most likely spend more time deliberating over whether
Mr. Thompson should be fired than it did properly vetting whether he should have been hired.. . . The necessary investigation into whether certain senior executives and
Board Members knew of Mr. Thompson’s deceptions before hiring him should not delay decisive action over his ethical breaches.. . . We once again call upon the Board to
immediately place Third Point’s entire slate on the Board replacing Mr. Thompson and Ms. Hart, appoint an interim CEO-we would suggest CFO Tim Morse or Head of
Global Media Ross Levinsohn and allow Third Point nominee Michael Wolf to Chair the Search Committee for a new permanent CEO. This is the only way for Yahoo!
to move past this embarrassing episode.” May 9, 2012 (Third Point LLC)
4. “We are writing to express our view that the board of directors of the Company and the Company’s management have, in recent years, done a terrible job managing
the Company’s operations and allocating shareholder capital.. . . The Company only discloses operating ratios by LTL and supply chain operations segments and does
not break out results for Canadian and US LTL. On the Company’s Q3 2011 conference call, Rick Gaetz, President and CEO, stated that Vitran’s ‘Canadian LTL
operation operated in the lower 90s and our US LTL operation operated in the low to mid 100s.’ GRAPHIC Management always has an excuse to justify this poor
performance.. . . New directors can add a new perspective on the Company, the industry and how to deal with Company’s problems while looking at the Company in a
more dispassionate manner.. . . As you can see, there is tremendous opportunity at Vitran to unlock the Company’s true value and put the Company on sounder financial
footing.” October 8, 2012 (Clark Investments)
5. “We believe the Board should immediately appoint three new directors we have identified, who are committed to working with the Board to rigorously re-examine the cur-
rent capital allocation and R&D strategy, aggressively focus on maximizing profitability, and engage a reputable investment bank to explore strategic alternatives.. . . THE
XYRATEX BOARD OWES THE COMPANY’S SHAREHOLDERS A FAIR AND THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO
THE COMPANY. Fortunately, despite the actions of the management team and the Board that have damaged value and eroded confidence in Xyratex, we continue to
believe that, given the very large disconnect between the market value of Xyratex stock and our conservative estimate of the Company’s intrinsic value, opportunities
exist within the control of the Board to unlock significant shareholder value.. . . IMMEDIATE SHAREHOLDER REPRESENTATION IS NEEDED ON THE BOARD
TO PROTECT AND MAXIMIZE VALUE FOR ALL SHAREHOLDERS. Furthermore, as we have steadily examined the Company’s recent actions and past practices,
we have grown increasingly disturbed by deficient corporate governance, which has drained value from shareholders and completely misaligned Board and shareholder
interests.” January 14, 2012 (Baker Street Capital Management, LLC)
Appendix 1 continues on the next page.
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Appendix 1: Illustrations of Activist Open Letters from 2012 to 2014 (continued)
6. “CHANGE IS NEEDED AT WALTER ENERGY. . . Importantly, Audley Capital believes there is substantial value in Walter Energy that is not reflected by the current
share price. Walter Energy has high-quality metallurgical coal assets in established mining jurisdictions with scope for significant growth, with a market position that
should enable it to generate substantial free cash flow going forward.. . . Despite Audley Capital’s confidence in the value of the metallurgical coal assets, we have been
dismayed by the way the business has been run in recent years and the loss of stockholder value. For example, the share price has underperformed major mining indices,
with the share price of Walter Energy falling 79% since its peak in April 2011 vs. only a 38% fall in the MSCI World Metals and Mining Index in the same period. This
share price weakness as compared to the met coal average price decline reflects the uninspiring management of the Company.. . . In that vein, we firmly believe that a
reconstituted Board—including Audley Capital’s director nominees—would be best placed to execute on these value-enhancing steps. Audley Capital’s director nominees
include individuals with extensive experience in the metallurgical coal industry on an international basis and possess the skills required to manage multi-jurisdictional
coal operations and their financing. We believe that they will bring a fresh, dynamic and creative approach to the Walter Energy Board.. . . We think that change is
long overdue, and are disturbed that despite the loss of stockholder value, we see the Board taking no accountability for questionable strategic, operational and financial
decisions. Further, the lack of consistent executive leadership is an underlying signal of lack of stability where it matters most.” March 25, 2013 (Audley Capital Advisors
LLP)
7. “Unfortunately, SVVC’s shareholders have to deal with reality and the reality is not pretty. SVVC’s NAV was down 4.2% in 2012 while the S&P 500 Index gained
16% and the discount ended the year at 23.8%.. . . It is difficult to understand how a diligent board of directors can justify the fees Kevin and his team have reaped
for what is indisputably poor performance. Check out Kevin’s reaction to the big losses SVVC incurred on Facebook when he was asked about it on CNBC. See
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000110102&play=1. He seems pretty sanguine about losing millions of dollars. Another instance of horrible timing was his
investment in SolarCity.. . . SVVC has a multitude of problems: a portfolio manager who is not very good and is excessively compensated, a weak board, poor NAV
performance, and a persistently wide discount. However, we think SVVC’s biggest problem is a flawed investment thesis.. . . How to Maximize SVVC’s Shareholder Value:
Both the pre-conversion shareholders and those that bought in the secondary offering are way under water. A number of shareholders have urged us to lead a campaign to
enhance shareholder value. Therefore, at the earliest opportunity, we intend to (1) elect directors who are committed to managing the discount and providing a liquidity
event, and (2) replace Kevin’s firm with one that is less ‘visionary’ but that has a track record of making money for investors.” April 10, 2013 (Bulldog Investors)
8. “It is our belief that it is the responsibility of the Board, on behalf of the company’s shareholders, to take advantage of such a large and unmistakable opportunity.
Indeed, we believe that by choosing not to increase the size of the repurchase program, the directors are actually performing a great disservice to the owners, especially
smaller shareholders who may not be in a position to buy more stock themselves.. . . In this letter, we have above summarized why we believe Apple is undervalued in
order to express how ridiculous it seems to us for Apple to horde so much cash rather than repurchase stock (and thereby use that cash to make a larger investment
in itself for the benefit of all of the company’s shareholders).. . . We have expressed above what we believe to be the company’s primary reason for not supporting our
proposal. Conversely, it is our belief that Apple’s current excess liquidity is without historical precedent and beyond reasonable comparison to its peers or otherwise, and
such dramatic overcapitalization affords the company enough excess liquidity to repurchase the amount of shares we proposed. Apple’s existing capital return program
has just $37 billion remaining, and the company has until the end of 2015 to complete it. Without any changes to the program, the largest pile of corporate cash in the
world is likely to grow even larger, and if the share price rises, this Board will have missed a great opportunity to use more of that hoarded cash to repurchase shares at
an attractive value.” January 23, 2014 (Icahn Enterprises L.P.)
9. “We have chosen to take this opportunity to express our dissatisfaction with certain Board and management policies that we find detrimental to shareholder value. Such
policies include the Company’s: a) lack of an investor communication program; b) weak corporate governance; and c) overcapitalized balance sheet. We believe that
these factors have had a deleterious impact on shareholder returns over a multi-year period. Furthermore, it is the responsibility of MicroStrategy’s Board of Directors to
pursue business and governance objectives that are in the best interest of all stakeholders (not just those that support the welfare of its Founder, Chairman and CEO).
In our view, the Board has acted in a way that fails to meet a reasonable standard of fiduciary behavior.. . . Furthermore, this policy of blatant non-communication has
directly resulted in the Company’s current pariah status on Wall Street—with only 4 sell-side analysts covering the stock (3 long time MicroStrategy analysts recently
dropped coverage). It is our opinion that the majority of institutional investors who take their fiduciary responsibilities seriously are reluctant or unwilling to consider
an investment in a company that refuses to communicate with its shareholders.” January 28, 2014 (Apex Capital, LLC)
10. “Dear Independent Members of the Board of Directors of Aaron’s, Inc.: You will soon have to make one of the most important decisions in Aaron’s history. In the
coming weeks, we believe that Aaron’s management will seek your approval for an alternative transaction that is very different from the open and transparent strategic
review process that we and other shareholders have advocated. This transaction may be a share repurchase, an acquisition or something else; the precise contours are
not important. What is important is that we believe that management’s latest self-entrenching scheme will be nothing more than short-term financial engineering to
temporarily increase earnings per share and mask the ongoing declines in system-wide profitability. If approved, this financial engineering will substantially increase the
execution risk to Aaron’s shareholders without any improvement to the company’s core business. We hope that you will strongly question the logic of adding risk to
Aaron’s at a time when its core business is already badly weakened by over two years of failed strategies and empty promises.. . . We are confident that when you look
at the facts and ask the hard questions, Ron’s latest plan—like all of his prior plans—will not be the right direction for Aaron’s.” March 14, 2014 (Vintage Capital
Management LLC)
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Appendix 2: Variable Definitions for Activist Open Letters from 2012 to 2014
Index i represents each activist open letter in our sample; index f represents a target firm; index a represents the activist; index
d represents the event day; index q represents the event year-quarter; index r represents raw firm returns; index v represents
value-weighted market returns; and index n represents the number of trading days in the corresponding measurement window.
Index d = 0 and q = 0 are the activist open letter date and year-quarter of that date, respectively. See Sections 3 and 4 for
more detail on all the variables.
Variable Definition Source
Target-Firm Attributes
Abnormal Returnsi
[
exp
[
d=0,1,5∑
d=0,−1,−5
ln (1 + rfd)
]
− 1
]
−
[
exp
[
d=0,1,5∑
d=0,−1,−5
ln (1 + rvd)
]
− 1
]
CRSP
Percent Quoted Spreadsfd
[
100× Askfd−Bidfd
(Askfd+Bidfd)/2
]
, time weighted as in Holden and Jacobsen (2014) DTAQ
Abnormal Spreadsi
d=0,1,5∑
d=0,−1,−5
Percent Quoted Spreadsfd
n
−
d=−30∑
d=−60
Percent Quoted Spreadsfd
n
DTAQ
∆ 8-K Filingsi
d=90∑
d=0
8-K Filingsfd −
d=−275,−1∑
d=−365,−90
8-K Filingsfd (see Section 3 for 8-K item numbers) SEC
∆ DEFA14A Filingsi
d=90∑
d=0
DEFA14A Filingsfd −
d=−275∑
d=−365
DEFA14A Filingsfd SEC
Log of Market Valuei Ln(pricef,d=0 × shares outstandingf,d=0) CRSP
ROAi Net incomef,q=0/total assetsf,q=0 Compustat
CAPEXi Capital expendituresf,q=0/total assetsf,q=0 Compustat
R&Di R&Df,q=0/total assetsf,q=0 Compustat
Institutional Ownershipi Total shares owned by institutionsf,q=0/shares outstandingf,q=0 FactSet
Analyst Followingi Analyst followingf,d=0 I/B/E/S
Cashi Cashf,q=0/total assetsf,q=0 Compustat
Intangiblesi Intangiblesf,q=0/total assetsf,q=0 Compustat
Entrenched Managementi 1 if the target firm’s BulletProof rating is above the sample median, 0 otherwise FactSet
Activist Attributes
Activist Ownershipi Activist ownership in the target as a percentage of common stocka,d=0 FactSet
High Activist Assets Under Management (AUM)i 1 if the activist’s AUMa,d=0 is greater than the sample median AUM, 0 otherwise FactSet
Missing FactSet Datai 1 if the activist campaign is not covered by SharkRepellent, 0 otherwise (see Section 3) FactSet
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Table 1
Panel A: Target Firm and Activist Descriptive Statistics for Activist Open Letters from 2012 to 2014
Index i represents the corresponding activist and target firm. All variables are winsorized at the two percent level except for indicator variables.
Variables that have a natural lower bound of zero (e.g., analyst following) are winsorized from the top only. All of our results are qualitatively similar
when we do not winsorize and when we winsorize at the 5 percent level. For entrenchment and activist AUM, our indicator variables do not equal
0.50 because of observations that do not link to SharkRepellent, for which we set these variables equal to zero (similar to Khanna et al., 2015). See
Section 3 for more detail on our data. See Appendix 2 for variable definitions.
All Activist Open Letters
Variable N Mean σ P25 P50 P75
Abs(Day 0 CAR)i 255 0.022 0.03 0.005 0.010 0.026
Abs([−1,+1 day] CAR)i 255 0.040 0.06 0.008 0.021 0.041
Abs([−5,+5 day] CAR)i 255 0.058 0.08 0.015 0.029 0.069
Day 0 CARi 255 0.013 0.03 -0.005 0.006 0.020
[−1,+1 day] CARi 255 0.024 0.06 -0.005 0.010 0.035
[−5,+5 days] CARi 255 0.035 0.09 -0.012 0.017 0.052
Day 0 Abn. Spreadi 255 -0.013 0.06 -0.016 -0.004 0.002
[−1,+1 day] Abn. Spreadi 255 -0.017 0.07 -0.013 -0.003 0.003
[−5,+5 days] Abn. Spreadi 255 -0.012 0.05 -0.013 -0.003 0.002
Day 0 Abn. Turnoveri 255 0.010 0.03 -0.002 0.001 0.008
[−1,+1 day] Abn. Turnoveri 255 0.009 0.03 -0.002 0.001 0.008
[−5,+5 days] Abn. Turnoveri 255 0.005 0.02 -0.002 0.001 0.006
∆ 8-K Filingsi 255 1.412 3.28 0.000 1.000 3.000
∆ DEFA14A Filingsi 255 3.486 6.26 0.000 1.000 5.000
Log of Market Valuei 255 21.544 2.09 19.981 21.450 22.879
ROAi 255 -0.001 0.04 -0.008 0.003 0.014
CAPEXi 255 0.029 0.05 0.006 0.013 0.035
R&Di 255 0.008 0.02 0.000 0.000 0.007
Institutional Ownershipi 255 0.568 0.34 0.366 0.683 0.831
Analyst Followingi 255 2.028 5.33 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cashi 255 0.166 0.17 0.035 0.114 0.247
Intangiblesi 255 0.166 0.19 0.012 0.084 0.278
Entrenched Managementi 255 0.416 0.49 0.000 0.000 1.000
Activist Ownershipi 255 0.057 0.06 0.002 0.052 0.085
High Activist AUMi 255 0.404 0.49 0.000 0.000 1.000
Missing FactSet Datai 255 0.208 0.41 0.000 0.000 0.000
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Table 1
Panel B: Year-Quarter Distribution for Activist Open Letters from 2012 to 2014
Year-Quarter t Activist Open Letterst
Activist Open Letterst
N = 255
2012Q1 16 6.27%
2012Q2 14 5.49%
2012Q3 13 5.10%
2012Q4 17 6.67%
2013Q1 36 14.12%
2013Q2 31 12.16%
2013Q3 21 8.24%
2013Q4 24 9.41%
2014Q1 29 11.37%
2014Q2 23 9.02%
2014Q3 15 5.88%
2014Q4 16 6.27%
Total 255 100%
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Table 1
Panel C: Target Firm Industry Distribution for Activist Open Letters from 2012 to 2014
Industry i Activist Open Lettersi
Activist Open Lettersi
N = 255
Consumer Nondurables 12 4.71%
Consumer Durables 7 2.75%
Manufacturing 22 8.63%
Energy, Oil, Gas, and Coal 17 6.67%
Chemicals and Allied Products 6 2.35%
Business Equipment 62 24.31%
Telecommunications 5 1.96%
Utilities 2 0.78%
Wholesale and Retail 37 14.51%
Health Care 24 9.41%
Finance 23 9.02
Other 38 14.90
Total 255 100%
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Table 2
Unsigned and Signed Stock Price Response to Activist Open Letters from 2012 to 2014
This table analyzes unsigned and signed cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of varying intervals for a target firm around the activist open letter date
(day 0). The intercepts are our main statistics of interest in Section 4.2. All of the independent variables are standardized to ensure that the intercept
can be interpreted without correction. Index i represents the corresponding activist and target firm. See Appendix 2 for exact variable definitions.
T-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the two-tailed
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variables: Unsigned and Signed Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) Around the Activist Open Letter Date
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Abs(Day 0 CAR)i Abs([−1,+1 day] CAR)i Abs([−5,+5 day] CAR)i Day 0 CARi [−1,+1 day] CARi [−5,+5 days] CARi
Intercept 0.022∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
(11.86) (11.97) (13.03) (6.14) (7.11) (7.05)
Log of Market Valuei -0.010
∗∗∗ -0.025∗∗∗ -0.036∗∗∗ -0.008∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ -0.042∗∗∗
(-3.27) (-3.56) (-4.20) (-2.46) (-3.99) (-4.70)
ROAi -0.000 0.003 0.009 -0.001 0.011
∗ 0.020∗∗
(-0.17) (0.29) (0.87) (-0.66) (1.74) (2.28)
CAPEXi 0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.005
(0.39) (0.64) (-0.43) (0.37) (-0.34) (-1.16)
R&Di 0.001 -0.000 -0.004 0.004
∗ 0.009∗ 0.004
(0.42) (-0.02) (-0.51) (1.73) (1.90) (0.49)
Institutional Ownershipi -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003
(-0.42) (-1.04) (-1.06) (-0.52) (-0.15) (-0.70)
Log of Analyst Followingi 0.001 0.005 0.008 -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.57) (1.25) (1.51) (-0.26) (-0.36) (0.21)
Cashi -0.003
∗ 0.001 0.006 -0.005∗∗ -0.003 0.004
(-1.72) (0.21) (0.76) (-2.20) (-0.73) (0.53)
Intangiblesi -0.001 0.003 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.007
(-0.52) (0.87) (0.66) (-0.36) (-0.61) (1.32)
Entrenched Managementi -0.001 -0.005 -0.007 0.003 -0.000 0.004
(-0.30) (-1.35) (-1.35) (1.12) (-0.04) (0.68)
Activist Ownershipi -0.004
∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(-2.15) (-3.04) (-3.34) (-2.11) (-4.05) (-2.81)
High Activist AUMi 0.006
∗∗ 0.013∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗
(2.42) (2.38) (2.62) (3.02) (3.21) (3.61)
Missing FactSet Datai 0.007
∗∗ 0.008∗ 0.012∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗
(2.51) (1.74) (1.87) (2.92) (2.20) (2.96)
Observations 255 255 255 255 255 255
R2 0.11 0.15 0.19 0.11 0.17 0.20
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Table 3
Bid-Ask Spread Response to Activist Open Letters from 2012 to 2014
This table analyzes abnormal bid-ask spreads of varying intervals for a target firm around the activist open letter date (day 0). The control period
for spreads is [−60,−30 days]. The intercepts are our main statistics of interest in Section 4.3. All of the independent variables are standardized to
ensure that the intercept can be interpreted without correction. Index i represents the corresponding activist and target firm. See Appendix 2 for
exact variable definitions. T-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variables: Abnormal Bid-Ask Spreads Around the Activist Open Letter Date
(1) (2) (3)
Day 0 Abn. Spreadi [−1,+1 day] Abn. Spreadi [−5,+5 days] Abn. Spreadi
Intercept -0.013∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗
(-3.36) (-4.21) (-3.64)
Log of Market Valuei 0.015
∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗
(2.09) (2.61) (2.08)
ROAi -0.001 -0.006 0.000
(-0.19) (-0.99) (0.05)
CAPEXi 0.004 0.003 0.002
(1.46) (0.94) (0.86)
R&Di 0.009 0.004 0.007
(1.15) (0.60) (1.08)
Institutional Ownershipi 0.003 0.005 0.003
(0.78) (1.33) (1.18)
Log of Analyst Followingi -0.003 -0.005 -0.004
(-0.73) (-1.03) (-1.18)
Cashi -0.007 -0.005 -0.001
(-1.11) (-0.93) (-0.24)
Intangiblesi -0.001 0.002 -0.004
(-0.14) (0.60) (-1.14)
Entrenched Managementi 0.000 0.003 0.003
(0.02) (0.59) (0.84)
Activist Ownershipi -0.003 -0.013 -0.004
(-0.45) (-1.52) (-0.84)
High Activist AUMi -0.004 -0.002 -0.001
(-0.69) (-0.42) (-0.22)
Missing FactSet Datai -0.011
∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗ -0.007
(-2.02) (-2.62) (-1.50)
Day 0 Abn. Turnoveri 0.001
(0.20)
[−1,+1 day] Abn. Turnoveri 0.005∗∗
(1.98)
[−5,+5 days] Abn. Turnoveri 0.001
(0.75)
Observations 255 255 255
R2 0.08 0.15 0.09
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Table 4
Activist Open Letters and Activism Success from 2012 to 2014
This table analyzes the association between activist open letters and several measures of activism success at the target firms. ISS stands for Institutional
Shareholder Services. For 203 of our 255 observations, we can link activist open letters to a FactSet database that contains details on the outcome
of that specific activist campaign. We match these 203 observations to 203 similar activist campaigns in FactSet that did not have an activist open
letter; we then compare the outcomes across the two samples. The sample without activist open letters represents our control sample; the sample
with activist open letters represents our treatment sample. The “Governance or Strategic Demands” outcome represents any governance or corporate
operating decision that traces to an activist’s agenda. We describe our matching procedure and the activism outcomes in more detail in Section
4.4. The treatment effect in this table is not necessarily causal; see Section 4.4 for the caveats to this analysis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical
significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Control Sample Treatment Sample Activist Open Letter
Activism Outcome (N = 203) (N = 203) Treatment Effect
Activist Wins Proxy Contest at Target 5.64% 31.03% +25.39%***
Activist Attains Directorship at Target 22.75% 33.99% +11.24%*
Activist Achieves Governance or Strategic Demands at Target 35.45% 69.95% +35.50%***
Activist Receives ISS or Glass Lewis Recommendation at Target 5.64% 31.03% +25.39%***
Special Shareholder Meeting Called by Target’s Board 3.00% 10.84% +7.84%*
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Table 5
Managerial Response to Activist Open Letters from 2012 to 2014
This table analyzes changes in 8-K and DEFA14A disclosures for a target firm around the activist open letter date (day 0). ∆ 8-K Filingsi in Column
1 represents total 8-K filings from [0,+90 days] minus total 8-K filings from [−365,−275 days]. The latter period represents the same measurement
window as the former period but in the year prior. ∆ 8-K Filingsi in Column 2 represents total 8-K filings from [0, +90 days] minus total 8-K filings
from [−90,−1 day]. Since DEFA14As follow calendar-time patterns, ∆ DEFA14A Filingsi in Column 3 represents total DEFA14A filings from [0,+90
days] minus total 8-K filings from [−365,−275 days]. The intercepts are our main statistics of interest in Section 4.5. All of the independent variables
are standardized to ensure that the intercept can be interpreted without correction. Index i represents the corresponding activist and target firm. See
Appendix 2 for exact variable definitions. T-statistics are in parentheses and standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance at the two-tailed 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
Dependent Variables: Disclosure Changes Around the Activist Open Letter Date
(1) (2) (3)
∆ 8-K Filingsi ∆ 8-K Filingsi ∆ DEFA14A Filingsi
Intercept 1.404∗∗∗ 0.983∗∗∗ 3.485∗∗∗
(6.91) (6.09) (9.19)
Log of Market Valuei 0.210 -0.153 1.225
∗∗∗
(0.76) (-0.69) (2.66)
ROAi -0.445
∗∗ -0.526∗∗∗ -0.384
(-2.10) (-3.31) (-0.69)
CAPEXi 0.111 -0.136 -0.595
∗∗
(0.54) (-0.93) (-2.34)
R&Di -0.295 -0.075 -0.173
(-1.28) (-0.42) (-0.50)
Institutional Ownershipi 0.668
∗∗∗ 0.229 0.445
(3.09) (1.32) (1.11)
Log of Analyst Followingi -0.146 0.044 -0.423
(-0.54) (0.24) (-1.47)
Cashi -0.140 -0.426
∗∗ -0.609
(-0.63) (-2.46) (-1.43)
Intangiblesi -0.173 -0.088 -0.127
(-0.77) (-0.49) (-0.34)
Entrenched Managementi -0.345 -0.291 -0.186
(-1.36) (-1.39) (-0.42)
Activist Ownershipi -0.033 -0.418
∗∗ -0.431
(-0.12) (-2.23) (-1.06)
High Activist AUMi 0.193 0.342 -0.177
(0.64) (1.48) (-0.38)
Missing FactSet Datai -0.119 -0.447
∗∗ -1.492∗∗∗
(-0.45) (-2.12) (-3.11)
Observations 255 255 255
R2 0.07 0.08 0.11
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